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ABSTRACT: This  paper’s  main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an indirect 
transcendental argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and society. Three 
related objections are addressed: a Stroud-type philosophical objection—as well as an empirical objection—
questioning the force of this kind of transcendental argument, and the objection that a version of ‘the paradox of 
fiction’ applies to this account.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This  paper’s  main  thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an 
indirect argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and 
society. This involves that believable novels are arguments, not in the sense that they are stories 
that explicitly offer arguments (perhaps didactically or polemically), but in the sense that, as 
wholes, they indirectly exhibit the distinctive structure of a kind of transcendental argument. As 
applied here, Stroud’s  influential  objection  (1968) to transcendental arguments would be that 
from believability, the only conclusion that could be licensed concerns how we must think or 
conceive of the real world. Moreover, Currie holds that such notions are probably false: the 
empirical  evidence  “is  all  against  this  idea…that  readers’  emotional  responses  track  the  real  
causal relations between things” (2011b). Finally,  a  version  of  the  ‘the  paradox  of  fiction’  
pertains. Certainly, responding with a full range of emotions to a novel requires that it be 
believable. Yet since we know the novel is fiction, we do not believe it. So in what does its 
believability consist? This paper will address these three related objections.1 
I  start  with  the  idea  that  believability  is  ‘the  master  criterion  of  the  novel’  (as  one  
reviewer of an ancestor of this paper put it), or at least is a central criterion of assessment. It is 
always reasonable to ask about a novel—is it successful  ‘make-believe’?  No  doubt  the  
distinctive power and sweep of the novel is its unrivaled potentiality for intricate plot and 
associated character development. But for any believable plot/character development complex, 
we can ask—what principles or generalizations would have to be true about the real world (of 
human psychology, action, and society) in order for the fictional complex to be believable? 
Because this also always seems a reasonable question to ask, and because it can be an 
unanalyzed datum or given that a novel is indeed believable, the following transcendental 
argument scheme is generated: 
                                                          
1 While this paper addresses these three possible objections, in two previous papers I consider other issues that arise 
in understanding some novels to be arguments (2011; 2012).  
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(1)  This story (complex) is believable. 
(2)  This story is believable only if such and such principles operate in the real world. 
(3)  Therefore, such and such principles operate in the real world. 
 
The believability premise, (1), is a proposition about the novel; it is not a self-referential claim 
made  by  the  novel  (although  in  degenerate  cases  such  as  parts  of  Henry  Fielding’s  Tom Jones the 
novel seems to be explicitly claiming about itself that it is believable). If (1) were an implicit or 
explicit claim made by the novel, the question of whether this claim itself is believable would 
arise, and so on into an unpleasant regress. The idea is that in virtue of being believable (not 
claiming to be believable), a novel makes an argument telling us something about the real world. 
(2) expresses the specific inference license or rule that allows a novel to be an argument, 
according to the present theory; it is not something that any novelist need intend or even be 
aware of. The idea is that the believability of a novel requires that certain principles or 
generalizations be true about the actual world. (3) is the conclusion. It indicates which principles 
operate in the real world, which is primarily of human nature given the subject matter of novels. 
For illustration, consider Nussbaum (1990, pp. 139-140) on Henry James’  The Golden Bowl: 
 
The claim that our loves and commitments are so related that infidelity and failure of response are more or 
less inevitable features even of the best examples of loving is a claim for which a philosophical text would 
have a hard time mounting direct argument. It is only when, as here, we study the loves and attentions of a 
finely  responsive  mind  such  as  Maggie’s,  through  all  the  contingent  complexities of a tangled human life, 
that. . .we have something like a persuasive argument that these features hold of human life in general. 
 
As applied here, (3)  is  the  generalized  (and  rosy)  “claim  that  our  loves  and  commitments  are  so  
related that infidelity and failure of response are more or less inevitable features even of the best 
examples of loving,” which is implicated by the believability of the plot/character development 
complex:  “the  loves  and  attentions  of  a  finely  responsive  mind  such  as  Maggie’s,  through all the 
contingent complexities of a tangled human life.” 
 The Nussbaum quotation also illustrates what is not all that uncommon: a vague, 
undeveloped recognition of the (transcendental) structure of the argument of a novel. Here is 
another example: Rodden  (2008,  p.  155)  says  “in  more  didactic  novels  such  as  George  Orwell’s  
1984, we are often aware of a presence arranging and evaluating ideas and characters in building 
a  convincing  argument.”  I  am  trying  to  shed  some  light  on  how  characters can be  ‘arranged’  into  
an argument, not, trivially, how (e.g.) the speeches of characters sometimes overtly state 
arguments. 
 These considerations mean that (1)-(3) constitute a schematic meta-level representation 
of the argument of a believable novel, which, at the object level, is only indirectly expressed by 
the novel. 
 
2. BELIEVABILITY AND THE PARADOX OF FICTION 
 
In what does believability consist? A  novel’s  believability  seems  to  be  determined  mostly  by  
what  can  be  called  the  ‘internal’  and  ‘external’  coherence of the event complex. I take Schultz 
(1979,  p.  233)  to  be  succinctly  explicating  internal  coherence  where  he  says:  “the  events  must  be  
motivated in terms of one another. . .either one event is a causal (or otherwise probable) 
consequence of another; or some events [sic] happening provides a character with a reason or 
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motive  for  making  another  event  happen”  (cf., e.g., Cebik, 1971, p. 16). A novel is not believable 
if in it things keep happening for no apparent reason or in a way that is inadequately connected 
with  the  other  events  in  the  novel.  Certainly,  this  applies  to  some  degree  to  James  Joyce’s  
Ulysses and  William  Burroughs’  Naked Lunch, for example.  
 But even if the events of a novel are fully connected, the novel may still not be 
believable because those connections do not cohere well with our widely shared basic 
assumptions about how human psychology and society not only actually, but necessarily work. 
This is the main component of external coherence. The believability of a novel requires that its 
plot and characters be developed in ways that generally conform to our fundamental shared 
assumptions about human nature. It might be wondered whether there is circularity here. I am 
saying both that the believability of a novel requires this kind of external coherence and, with the 
rule of inference (2) above, that the believability of a novel implicates certain truths of human 
nature. However, it seems there is no pernicious circularity, mainly because both of these 
statements are meta-level generalities. Even though at the object level a given novel’s  specific  
argument is only indirectly made by the novel itself, the reader or reviewer can summarize how 
the argument proceeds. And in this summary, there is no appearance of circularity. The summary 
starts with the unadorned premise that the novel—let Henry  James’  The Golden Bowl again be 
the example—is believable. It seems that generally, believability is experienced by the reader as 
a simple, unanalyzed datum or measure of the novel, continuously updated as the reader 
progresses through the novel and imaginatively engages with it. And, like Aristotle said about 
judging the happiness of a person, you do not know for sure about believability until you reach 
the  novel’s  end. Of course, a few paragraphs back, there is already a conveniently short 
abbreviation of the remainder of this novel’s  argument. Put another way, the experience of a 
novel’s  believability is one thing, determining which specific truths of human nature are 
implicated may be quite another and may lie in the province of literary criticism. 
A novel does not have to be realistic in order to be believable. The events of a novel can 
be far-fetched or remote, as in a science fiction, fantasy, or allegorical novel. Extremism of this 
sort seems to have little effect on believability so long as the events related are reasonably well-
connected, and our fundamental shared assumptions about human nature, and about physical 
nature of course, are generally respected. Even with substantial alterations in fiction of physical 
or  psychic  reality,  if  the  author’s  development  of  these  alterations  is  internally  consistent  and  
coherent  and  exhibits  firm  suspension  of  the  author’s  disbelief,  and  if  the  author  successfully  
depicts the characters as believing what is going on as if it is normal, this can make the novel 
believable  for  the  reader.  (The  author  in  effect  says,  ‘suppose  for  the  sake  of  argument…’)  There  
may be a kind of transference or transitivity of the suspension of disbelief here. For such a novel, 
trusting the characters and watching them for signs seems analogous to watching flight 
attendants for signs the flight is going well or badly—a  kind  of  ‘reality  check’,  as  it  were.  On  the 
other hand, a novelist may push the envelope regarding physical nature (a possible example is H. 
P.  Lovecraft’s  novella  The Call of Cthulhu) or psychic reality (a possible example is Max 
Beerbohm’s  Zukeila Dobson), to the point where neither we, nor the characters, nor the author 
really understand what is going on. Here, believability breaks down, and consequently, no 
argument can get off the ground. 
In  using  Coleridge’s  (1817, p. 314) phrase  “suspension  of  disbelief”  here, I do not mean 
to suggest that the believability of a novel involves believing that its event complex is true; 
rather, it involves believing that the event complex could have been true in a strong sense of 
‘could’—stronger, for example, than that of mere logical possibility. As Aristotle famously said, 
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“the  poet’s  job  is  not  to  tell  what  has  happened  but  the  kind of things that can happen, i.e., the 
kind  of  events  that  are  possible  according  to  probability  or  necessity”  (Poetics, Ch. 9). So while 
nonfictional narration (history, biography, etc.) aims at veracity, the novel aims at verisimilitude 
or depicting events  and  characters  “according to probability or necessity,”  which  I  would  explain  
as determined principally by internal and external coherence.2 
This approach suggests a solution to the much-discussed  ‘paradox  of  fiction/of fictional 
emotions’. It certainly seems that the believability of a novel and our emotional response to the 
novel are  interrelated:  a  novel’s  being  believable  allows responding to it with a full range of 
emotions, or conversely, responding with a full range of emotions to a novel requires that it be 
believable. Yet since we know it is fiction, we do not believe it. So how can it be both steadfastly 
unbelieved and believable—known to be false and (e.g.) a tear-jerker? More formally, the 
paradox of fiction is that although all three of the following propositions seem plausible, they 
cannot all be true: 
 
a:  We have genuine emotional responses to certain fictional narratives. 
b:  We believe that those narratives are fictional. 
c:  (a) and (b) are incompatible (each implies the denial of the other).  
 
Thus, solutions typically deny one or the other of these three propositions. What are generally 
regarded as implausible or distorted solutions, either deny (a), as in the case of Walton’s 
postulation  of  “quasi-emotions”  (e.g.,  1978),  or  they deny (b) (e.g., Suits, 2006). 
The solution suggested by the above, like most solutions, denies (c), but I think it 
uniquely gives believability a prominent role. It is a possible-world solution. We believe that the 
plot/character development complex (event complex) of a novel is not real because we know that 
generally it is a merely possible (nonactual) world constructed by the novelist. However, for a 
believable novel, the possible world constructed by the novelist is strongly ‘accessible’ from the 
actual world, where the core idea of one world being accessible to another is that the one is 
possible given the facts of the other—in this case, notably, the basic facts of human nature.  The 
basic facts of human nature are held common across the worlds. Thus, accessibility grounds 
believability, which in turn grounds emotional response. Although believability requires that 
perceived fundamental facts of human (and physical) nature be respected, a novel is a complex 
counterfactual. But it is commonplace that we have emotional responses, unquestionably 
genuine, to all manner of situations that are not presently actual—and so are counterfactual in at 
least this sense. Indeed, it is hard to see how there could be practical reasoning without such 
responses. 
I  don’t  know  about you, but I fear a stock market crash. This fear fully motivates me to take 
measures to minimize the financial damage to me should a crash occur. It may be that the 
particular kind of crash that I fear has not and will never in fact occur (though it could be 
significantly probable), and so, unbeknownst to me, the possibility is metaphysical and not 
merely epistemic (‘for  all  I  know,  we’re  in  for  a  crash’). Of course, the counterfactuals of a novel 
are generally metaphysical—the events and characters depicted have not and will never occur or 
exist (in the actual world). But this is by no means always the case. For example, consider some 
of the events of From the Earth to the Moon by Jules Verne, or consider any historical fiction. 
                                                          
2 The distinction between nonfictional and fictional narration with respect to believability may not be as sharp as 
suggested here. Olmos (2014; forthcoming) proposes a general account of credibility that covers both types of 
narration. 
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My key point is that it seems to make little if any difference to our emotional response whether 
the possibilities (counterfactuals) we consider are perceived to be metaphysical or epistemic, 
fictional or temporary, so long as they are believable. The critical link and parity among them is 
that they are all creatures of the imagination, wherein their believability is determined. However, 
the perceived status of the possibility may of course make a big difference in our behavioral 
response. Adapting a favorite example, we may be horrified by the events depicted in a horror 
film because they are believable; yet because  we  don’t  believe  them,  we  don’t  flee  the  theater. In 
other  words,  we  don’t  flee  the  theater  because  we know the possible world of the horror film is 
metaphysical, in relevant ways. Failing to adequately take into account such differences in 
behavioral response perhaps (confusedly) leads to thinking that emotional responses to fiction 
are themselves qualitatively distinctive or  are  only  “quasi-emotions.” 
We use our emotional—or more generally, affective—responses to different possible 
courses of future actions or events (and their potential consequences) to help test them out and 
select among them where we have a choice, or to be prepared where what will happen is out of 
our control. The thought of such a possibility may bring fear, anger, disgust, anxiety, interest, 
arousal, joy, or whatever, but the bottom line seems to be that “emotions” have  a  “cognitive  
dimension”  in  that  they “embody  some  of  our  most  deeply  rooted  views about what has 
importance, views that could easily be lost from sight during sophisticated intellectual 
reasoning” (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 42; cf. Johnston, 2001). Such affective responses to fictional 
possibilities figure in the contribution that reading novels makes to enhancing practical reasoning 
skill, which is by “offering  us  the  opportunity  to  practice  thinking  about  difficult  and  interesting  
situations and complex personalities and providing us with examples of how to discriminate 
salient features of such situations and characters” (Depaul, 1988, p. 563; cf. also Clark, 1980, 
and Gendler & Kovakovich, 2006 for some similarities to the approach I take here).  
 
3. THE STROUD-TYPE PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTION 
 
Transcendental arguments on the order, for example, of Davidson’s  directed  against  skepticism  
about other minds (1991, pp. 159-160), reason that since certain aspects of our experience or 
inner world are undeniable, the external world must have certain features, on the grounds that its 
having these features is a necessary condition of our experience being the way it is. In my 
representation, the argument of a believable novel is of this type. Stroud (1968) famously 
objected to such transcendental arguments that they are too ‘ambitious’ (the terminology is 
Stern’s, 2007)—that the only condition and conclusion that could be licensed is that we must 
think or conceive of the external world as having certain features, not that it actually does. The 
objection as applied to the novels case is that it would be enough to allow our experience of 
believability if having this experience implicated only that we perceive the real world as 
operating in accordance with certain principles. 
The first thing to note in response is that this ‘modest’  version  of  the  transcendental argument of 
a believable novel is still an argument; there  is  still  an  argument  whether  we  take  “real  world”  in 
(2) and (3) of the schematic representation above to refer to the real world simpliciter or to how 
we must conceive of the real world. 
Second, no doubt in certain cases I may find a novel believable, whereas you do not. But 
I think that there is no fundamental relativity of believability because there is such a thing as 
human nature, which we all share and to which we have significant introspective  or  ‘privileged’  
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access, or at least psychological attunement.3 The believable novel taps into and relies on these 
facts, bringing operant principles to the fore. If this general idea were not true, then it would be 
pretty inexplicable that there is widespread agreement about which novels are good novels. 
Being believable is a central necessary condition for a novel to be a good novel. So in the case of 
the ambitious version of the argument of a novel that began this paper, the leap from the inner to 
outer worlds is limited and facilitated. The leap is from our psychological experience of 
believability of the novel to the real world of human psychology, action, and society—which is 
the primary subject matter of all novels. This subject matter is basically human nature, I take it. 
The inner and outer worlds of the ambitions argument are significantly the same; it is not as if 
the  worlds  are  distinct  as,  for  example,  thought  and  a  brain  in  a  vat,  as  in  Putnam’s memorable 
transcendental argument (1981, Ch. 1). And, as Nagel (1979, Ch. 12) forcefully argued, because 
after all we are human, we know what it is like to be human in a way we do not know what it is 
like to  have  a  different  nature,  such  as  a  bat’s (and perceive the world primarily through 
echolocation, be capable of flying, etc.). 
Such philosophical considerations indicate that the principles identified in the argument 
of the novel resonate in believability largely because they are true of human nature; they indicate 
that some ambitious version of the argument of the novel is justified.  
 
4. THE CURRIE-TYPE EMPIRICAL OBJECTION 
 
In recent years, Currie has made something of a cottage industry for himself questioning such 
claims on empirical grounds—questioning, as he likes to put it, ‘whether we learn about the 
mind from literature’.  It is no doubt common to think that we do so-learn; for example, consider 
Lehrer’s  2007  book  Proust Was a Neuroscientist.  Currie’s writing on this topic includes pieces 
in the popular press (2011a; 2011b; 2013). Perhaps his most strident, though scholarly, 
articulation of his view is this (2012, p. 30): 
 
And could [Samuel] Johnson have been rationally confident that Shakespeare has shown how human nature 
acts in real exigencies, when he, Johnson, carried out no surveys, no carefully structured experiments, to 
find out whether it really was so? Johnson was delightfully confident in his opinions of many things, and 
rated himself a great observer of his fellow creatures, but the last 50 years of psychological investigation 
has shown how often we are wrong about our own motives and actions, and those of others, and how little 
penetrating intellect and common sense can help us overcome our ignorance. When Leavis says, rather 
grudgingly, that Hard Times does  not  give  “a  misleading  representation  of  human  nature”  (Leavis  1948,  p.  
233) it is tempting - to ask how he could possibly know something that not even the greatest psychologist 
would think of claiming: what human nature is. 
 
Of  course  my  answer  to  Currie’s  last  point  is  that  the  believability of Hard Times has something 
to do with it. Currie’s  view  constitutes a challenge to my claim that some ambitious version of 
the transcendental argument of a believable novel is justified, which would require that our 
conceptions of human nature are generally true. Again, I claim that the believable novel taps into 
and relies on these conceptions, bringing operant principles to the fore. 
                                                          
3 A recent influential article on introspection (Schwitzgebel, 2008) poses little threat to my points here concerning 
human nature and its operant principles, because the focus of the article is on the untrustworthiness of introspection 
of immediate conscious experience.  
Differences among readers in the perceived believability of a novel may be largely attributable to relatively 
extraneous factors, such as the setting of the novel. For example, if I could get past the fantastic details of Tolkein’s  
trilogy, I think I could better appreciate these novels as implicating truths of human nature.  
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Let us for the moment try to step back from the  possible  detail  of  “surveys”  and  “carefully 
structured experiments”  and  look  at the big picture. By virtually any biological measure such as 
population numbers and adaptability to different environments, Homo sapiens are an extremely 
and uniquely successful social species. (Indeed, we are so successful that in some ways we are 
victims of our own success: overpopulation, pollution, etc.) Is it not obvious that this success 
would not be possible if  we  were  largely  “wrong about our own motives and actions, and those 
of others” or in general about our conceptions of human  nature,  and  if  “penetrating intellect and 
common sense”  were  of  little use in augmenting self- and social knowledge? We know ourselves 
and others and the operant psychological/sociological principles or generalizations well enough 
that our actions and interactions are mostly predictable, often drearily so. Our fundamental, 
shared conceptions of human nature allow us to function and flourish, and this is evidence of 
their (at least approximate) truth, in much the same way that the spectacular success of the 
physical sciences in their predictive power and technological applications (‘they  work’) is 
evidence of their (at least approximate) truth. 
This seems to be so even if something like epiphenomenalism is true, whereby our 
conscious and self-conscious life is not causally efficacious in the physical world. As far as any 
competition for world  domination  by  a  “social”  creature  goes, ants are perhaps our only real 
rival. But we are sharply unlike ants. We have a mental life, and it is a rich mental life. It is hard 
to see how we could function and flourish if our mental life were so out of sync with reality as in 
Currie’s  bleak  picture,  even  if  mental processes only attend physical processes—where the real 
action is. It seems that such a mental life would consist largely of bewilderment and confusion.  
But epiphenomenalism is a radical view. Suppose rather that conceptualization and 
thinking come to the fore and are causally efficacious primarily in such things as problem-
solving, including in response to when we act or interact in unexpected fashion, and that 
otherwise we mostly unthinkingly function with reliable ‘animal’  expectations of our behaviors 
(behaviors that are predictable by us but not predicted). This seems to be more like what is 
actually the case. Yet of course it is then all the more implausible that we could function and 
flourish and our mental life be so out of sync with reality  as  in  Currie’s  view. 
None of this is like a suspicious evolutionary argument about the origins of some specific 
creature feature. One may easily get tangled up in alternative possible explanations of particular 
adaptations. For example, at one point paleontologists thought that the regression relationship 
between the dorsal fin area and the body volume of the pelycosaur showed that this ‘sail’ fin was 
a temperature-regulating mechanism. Later, this explanation was more or less replaced by the 
behavioral explanation that the fin was used for sexual display (Gould, 2007, p. 253). Of course 
it could have had both functions, or neither. Our conceptions of human nature, as a whole, lie at 
an altogether different level. There is no alternative possible explanation of their existence and 
entrenchment other than that they have evolved in answer to millions of years of human needs. 
So what are the kinds of psychological “surveys”  and  “carefully  structured  experiments” Currie 
uses to make his case that our conceptions of human nature are largely wrong,  that  “our  insight  
into  the  mind  generally  is  very  limited”? One  is  the  “imagined  professor” experiment, which 
indicates that to do better at a game of Trivial Pursuit, for example, imagining a professor helps, 
whereas imagining a soccer hooligan hurts. This is supposedly surprising, and illustrates that 
“our  minds  are  prone  to  capture  by unconscious  imitation.”  More  significantly,  this  principle  is  
said to be borne out in the strong empirical evidence  of  a  causal  relationship  between  “media  
violence  and  imitative  aggression,” about which there  is  supposedly  a  huge  “disconnect  between  
research results and public opinion” (2010, p. 201). 
 
1176 
 
Another allegation is that folk psychology, like the novel, believes in character and character 
explanations,  and  that  makes  us  prone  to  error,  as  when  we  “infer  good  character  from  attractive  
appearance.”  Experiments suggest that small changes in circumstances can make a big difference 
in  our  behavior,  as  where  “people  who  have  just  found  a  dime  in  a  phone  booth”  are  a  lot  more  
likely to assist someone outside in need of help than those who had no such luck. (I know the 
example is dated!)  Of  seminarians  on  their  way  to  “give  a  short  talk  on  the  parable  of  the  Good  
Samaritan,”  one  group  was  told  there  was  “no  hurry,”  and  the  rest  that  they  were  “slightly  late.”  
On  the  way,  “a  confederate  faked  a  collapse.”  Compared to those in the no-hurry group, the 
others were a great deal more likely to ignore and even step over the collapsed person (2010, pp. 
202-203). 
Another allegation is that our minds are prone to illegitimately link the literal and the 
metaphorical, as in the case of “our  ready  use  of  a  warmth-coldness  scale  for  persons…from  
developmentally important experiences of physical closeness to caregivers.”  If  you  briefly hold a 
hot cup of coffee, you are then more likely to behave generously and classify a person with 
whom  you  are  interacting  as  “warm”  (2010,  p.  204).   
It seems that each of these specific allegations is to some degree disputable, but I will not 
do that here. Similarly, I will not respond to Currie’s  ad hominem against novelists and other 
creative people; for example, he  cites  “a  mid-1990s study of creative groups which found that 
only one of fifty writers (Maupassant)  was  free  of  psychopathology”  (2011b).  It should be 
enough to point out that compared to the reasons for believing that our conceptions of human 
nature, on the whole, allow us to function and flourish, the kind of evidence of detail that Currie 
presents seems to be a case of not being able to see the forest for the trees. Indeed, it is hard to 
see how any amount of such evidence of detail would be equal to the task Currie assigns it. 
To be sure, at a higher level, Currie  says  “we  have  little  grounds  on  which  to  trust  our  
folk-psychological theories—any more than we these days trust folk physics, which has been 
shown to be substantially at odds with scientifically informed theories of the interaction of 
bodies”  (2010,  pp.  201-202). Yet does this just confuse the general vagueness of folk psychology 
and folk physics with falsity, or is it trying to say what anyone should admit, that as you go from 
folk to scientific theories, the truths identified tend to become less approximate (where this trend 
is less clear or more plagued with historical exceptions in  the  “social”  sciences)? Should we stay 
off the pyramids because the ancient Egyptians used folk physics? At perhaps a less exacting 
level than the pyramid builders, we are always or almost always interacting with bodies in ways 
that could reasonably be said to require our use of folk physics, e.g., cooking dinner, driving a 
car, or playing baseball. Current theoretical physics should undermine our trust here not one wit, 
or if it did,  one  wants  to  say  ‘that  way  insanity  doth  lie’. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Finally,  Currie  says  that  “we  have  been  strangely  complacent  in  assuming  that  we  do  learn  [from 
fiction],  without  any  better  evidence  than  our  own  feelings  of  having  learned  something”  (2011a,  
p. 49). This paper has tried to show that, on the contrary, such feelings may be firmly grounded 
in the believability of the fiction, and all that is entailed by that, so the complacency is not 
strange. It is warranted. 
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